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Abstract 
On 23 June 2016, the British people decided to leave the European Union in a referendum that has 
inaugurated a period of considerable uncertainty. Before the vote, national and international organisations 
warned against the negative long-term implications that such an unprecedented decision could have for the 
UK’s economy, and generally for the everyday life of its citizens. This dissertation shall focus on the short-
term implications of Brexit instead. Following the announcement of the referendum, and especially after the 
vote to leave, there have already been some negative consequences for the British economy. Uncertainty 
seems to be behind the deterioration of the UK’s economic climate, and poses a serious threat to its future 
economic stability.  
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Introduction 
One year ago, on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union in a referendum 
that will probably make history. The sentiment of discontent with the European Union and the nostalgia for 
the ‘good old days’ of national sovereignty when Britain ruled the waves prevailed among British voters, 
who chose to back Brexit. 
The referendum was held after the then prime minister, David Cameron, thought it was time ‘for the British 
people to have their say’, promising to address the growing disillusionment in his country with the 
European Union (Cameron, et al., 2013). A vote to leave triggered a period of political instability that still 
continues and recently culminated with an inconclusive election that produced a hung parliament in May 
2017. The unprecedented decision to exit the European Union paved the way for long and complex 
negotiations. This has produced a climate of uncertainty that might have affected the UK economy in many 
different ways (Irwin, 2015).  
One year ago, things were different. One pound still bought 1.46 dollars, David Cameron was still prime 
minister of the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage still insistently wanted his country back, his party, the UKIP, 
was still doing well, and the National Health System (NHS) was still being deprived of 350 million pounds a 
week that went to the European Union. One year later, all of that has changed, except for the NHS funding.  
Some positive figures, in particular those related to GDP growth, led some Brexit enthusiasts to downplay 
gloomy forecasts, claiming that data-rich warnings issued by respected national and international 
organisations were just scaremongers and threats (The Sun, 2016a; The Sun, 2016b; Daily Mail, 2016). Yet, 
reality seems to be slightly more complex than a headline in a newspaper. This dissertation shall attempt to 
investigate the changes in the UK economy by examining the economic impact of both the EU referendum 
announcement and its result in the United Kingdom. This dissertation shall begin by assimilating the key 
literature that has sought to estimate the economic consequences of Brexit. In addition to this, it shall 
present the historical background of the relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union, 
as it is essential to understand what led the country to reconsider its membership. It shall then focus on the 
impact of Brexit on the financial sector. The analysis shall firstly examine the effects on the pound’s value, 
before analysing the stock market, and additionally using certain companies on the stock market for in-
depth analysis. The gilt market shall conclude the analysis of the financial sector. Then this dissertation shall 
take into account the effects of the EU referendum on industrial production and consumer spending. It 
shall examine GDP trends, and then the level of confidence of British firms. The analysis shall develop by 
investigating the patterns in inflation and unemployment, before turning to study consumers’ confidence 
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levels, saving ratio, and the real estate market. Also, it shall examine trends in immigration and hate crime, 
which could reflect an increasingly unfavourable climate surrounding inflows of people from other 
nationalities or with different ethnic backgrounds. In conclusion, this dissertation shall outline the main 
consequences for the UK economy in the short-term. 
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Literature review 
The field of Brexit has received increasing academic interest in the last few years, especially after the 
decision to hold a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union was formalised. The 
academic debate has been lively. Most research has concluded that Britain is likely to be worse-off outside 
the European Union, although there is no consensus among researchers on what the extent of this loss 
would be (Armstrong & Portes, 2016).  There are very few exceptions to this mainstream view (Dhingra, et 
al., 2016c). However, it is important to note that research has mainly focused on the long-term 
consequences of Brexit, while neglecting the short-term impact. 
The most detailed analysis of the alternatives facing the UK in the long-term is the UK government’s 
analysis ‘The long-term economic impact of EU membership and the alternatives’ (HM Treasury, 2016a). As 
the withdrawal of a member state is an unprecedented event in the history of the European Union (PwC, 
2016), the government’s analysis made hypotheses about possible scenarios consistent with the existent 
relationships of other countries with the European Union and determined three options. Although none of 
these alternatives would ensure full access to the European Single Market (ESM), all of these options would 
be costly, and the cost would be positively correlated with the benefits from being able to participate in the 
Single Market (HM Treasury, 2016a). The main drawback for the UK would be that no model outlined by 
the government would allow them to have their say on legislation implemented in the European Union, 
even that regarding the Single Market (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016a). 
The option which would allow a continued access to the Single Market with few obligations would be 
joining the European Economic Area (EEA). As a member of the EEA, the UK would enjoy free trade of 
goods and services1, along with free movement of capital and people, the so-called ‘four freedoms’ at the 
foundation of the European Single Market (European Union, 2010). The UK would independently run its 
own foreign policy, and would not be obliged to join the common currency, nor it would be part of the 
common customs union (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016a). Enjoying the benefits of the EEA comes at a cost: the 
UK would still have to comply with all the regulations regarding the Single Market, and it would need to 
contribute to the European Union’s budget, and savings on direct transfers are likely to be modest (Dhingra 
& Sampson, 2016a). 
A second-best option would be striking a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union. The terms 
of such deal would need to be negotiated, and this can take a long time (HM Treasury, 2016a). A bilateral 
                                                             
1 Tariffs would still be imposed on agricultural products and fisheries (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016a). 
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agreement would probably cover most of trade in goods, but it is likely to leave out the services sector (HM 
Treasury, 2016a), which is an essential part of the UK’s economy (Booth, et al., 2015). A precedent is set by 
the Swiss contractual model, which consists of a number of agreements negotiated on each specific issue, 
from education to aviation (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016a). 
Resorting to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) terms would be the fall-back option. This would mean 
that the UK would trade with the EU under WTO rules, with the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause2. The 
UK would be only one of the 162 entities involved in the agreements. This scenario would be limited to 
goods trade, and the UK would have to face an external tariff (and so would the EU) (HM Treasury, 2016a). 
To avoid the WTO conditions, a radical perspective is that proposed by Dhingra et al. (2016b) in which it is 
assumed that the UK could unilaterally decide to abolish all its tariff barriers. This would only apply to 
goods trade, and financial services would still be excluded.  
Overall, the long-term impact would be negative, as most research seems to suggest. Uncertainty over the 
negotiations makes it difficult to predict what the impact of Brexit will be on the UK’s economy. Whilst all 
studies employ different forecasting models, they all tend to show negative figures for GDP growth and 
employment levels for the UK, explained by a loss in economic openness and competitiveness on 
international markets. The Treasury’s analysis estimates that in 2030 the GDP could be lower by 6.2 percent 
in case the UK manages to secure a FTA rather than being a member of the EU, or the loss could be -7.5 
percent if it had to trade under WTO’s rules; the decline in GDP levels would be smaller (-3.8 percent) if the 
UK joined the EEA, with households being overall worse-off (HM Treasury, 2016a). The OECD’s study finds 
that the impact is less strong, but still negative in the same timeframe under a FTA or WTO scenario, with a 
5.1 reduction in GDP levels (OECD, 2016b). Armstrong and Portes (2016) are more optimistic, although their 
findings are still negative, predicting a contraction in national output levels ranging of -1.8 percent or -3.2 
percent in case of an EEA or a WTO scenario respectively. The main conclusion of these studies is that 
uncertainty would have consequences for the UK’s economic performance in the short-run, whereas in the 
long-term goods trade and financial services restrictions would hit the economy (Armstrong & Portes, 
2016). 
Losing access to the largest Single Market in the world would be detrimental for the UK in the long-run 
(Bank of England, 2015). The UK has very close economic ties with the rest of the European Union; by 2014, 
the UK received from the European Union 53 percent of its total imports, and exports to the bloc accounted 
for 45 percent of the total (Bank of England, 2015), with over 3 million export-related jobs (OECD, 2016b). 
                                                             
2 A non-discrimination provision that allows different countries to be treated equally in trade. 
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In the long-term, goods trade would be hit by tariffs that may be imposed and regulatory divergence would 
be costly, offsetting the potential savings generated by a reduction in red-tape (OECD, 2016b). In 2015, the 
UK had a trade deficit of 68.8 billion with the EU, accounting for 3.6 percent of its GDP, although the 
negative figures for goods trade were offset in part by a surplus in services that accounted for 1.1 percent 
of GDP, equivalent to 20.9 billion sterling pounds (HM Treasury, 2016a). By reducing ties with the European 
Union, multinational companies may consider the United Kingdom as a less suitable place where to have 
their headquarters for the Single Market, and might choose to relocate somewhere else in Europe (Irwin, 
2015). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the UK from the European Union would be lower, and a decline in 
investments would hit productivity and innovation (OECD, 2016b). The decline in FDI would be particularly 
marked for the financial sector; services and insurances are the main sector of the UK’s economy, 
accounting for almost 7 percent of the UK’s GDP (OECD, 2016b), and over 1 million jobs (Tyler, 2017). 80 of 
more than 350 banks in the UK are using London as a hub for their operations with rest of the EU (Bank of 
England, 2015). Even after the withdrawal, London could retain its comparative advantage in providing 
financial services, and the scrapping of European regulations which are perceived as a burden for financial 
markets would be an extra incentive for financial activity, although overall gains could be lower than 
expected (Springford & Whyte, 2014).  
In the short-term, the main determinant of a negative outlook would be uncertainty (HM Treasury, 2016b). 
Not knowing what the outcome of the negotiations would be during the two-year period for the 
withdrawal negotiations would lead households and businesses to readjust their spending in line with 
expectations of being poorer in the future (HM Treasury, 2016b). Businesses’ confidence would be hit, with 
companies unsure about the level of demand and the UK’s ability to strike a deal that would allow it to 
continue being part of the Single Market (HM Treasury, 2016b). On the other hand, households would 
begin to save and their purchasing power would reduce with rising prices (HM Treasury, 2016b). 
Uncertainty would cause instability on financial markets, in terms of increased risk premia for credit and 
equity markets for companies and for the government (PwC, 2016). By analysing the pattern of Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS)3, it can be seen that the cost of shoring against risk of default rose after November 
2015, consistent with negative forecasts for the British economy in case of a vote to leave (HM Treasury, 
2016b). This would go along with a rise in inflation and a depreciation of the British pound on currency 
markets (PwC, 2016), as investors would start selling sterling-denominated assets fearing further falls in 
                                                             
3 Financial contracts that insure against the default risk of the issuer of an asset. 
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value. This has been signalled by increasing volatility in the run-up to the EU referendum which continued 
also in the following months (HM Treasury, 2016b). 
13 
 
A love-hate relationship: a historical background 
The UK has never been an enthusiastic member of the European Union (Baldini, 2016, p. 16). It has always 
enjoyed a unique degree of flexibility and selectivity that allowed the British government to choose to opt 
in or out depending on the policies discussed in Brussels (Emerson, 2015, p. 109). 
A PLAN TO UNITE EUROPE 
With the memories of WW2 still vivid, in 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, put forward a 
plan to pool the production of coal and steel between Germany and France. The scheme was open to any 
other European state that wished to participate. Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy embarked 
on the project that led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris that established the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951. The British government rejected the proposal in the first place, primarily 
because it had no need to cut ties with the past, and, more importantly, because it considered the UK’s 
post-war economy far stronger than that of the other countries (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 97). Joining the ECSC 
would have meant losing sovereignty, a non-negotiable clause of the agreement.  
Following the successful achievements in terms of cooperation within the ECSC, its member states signed 
the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) with the 
objective of a more inclusive general common market. The Treaty was the outcome of a careful balance 
between dirigisme and free-market economics (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 111). Its institutions, the Commission 
and the Council, were boosted by the economic achievements of the new scheme. In fact, the EEC’s start 
was successful, with trade among the six members surging by 166 percent in just over seven years, and 
industrial output growing by 52 percent (Mammarella & Cacace, 2013, p. 131). In 1959, British prime 
minister Harold Macmillian tried to interfere with the EEC project by establishing the European Free Trade 
Association, along with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal, that was meant to 
be a less political and more economic form of integration (Mammarella & Cacace, 2013, p. 107), yet the 
advances made by the EEC were striking. The Economist (1957) describes the objective of a wide free-trade 
area led by the EEC as ‘encouragingly pragmatic’ and suitable for Britain’s interests because of the Treaty’s 
adaptability. Driven by the progress made by the EEC, the British government under Macmillian applied to 
be a member of the economic community in 1961, but the proposal was rejected by Charles De Gaulle’s 
government (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 128). When De Gaulle left politics in 1969, the UK applied again, but the 
application came at a time of great turbulence for the world’s economy. While the 1960s had been a period 
of constant and rapid economic growth, in 1971 a deep recession hit the global economy, as the 
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international monetary system collapsed. For the UK, this meant that it could not experience the positive 
aspects of the integration, and thus the people’s commitment to the ideal of European integration was not 
as strong as in the founding countries (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 136). In addition to this, the downturn was 
heightened by the first oil crisis in 1973. Along with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway sought to join 
the EEC. In Ireland and Denmark, referenda approved the membership, whereas Norway rejected it. The 
UK’s Tory prime minister, Edward Heath, refused to hold a referendum (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 136). Harold 
Wilson’s Labour Party won the 1974 general election, after having campaigned to renegotiate the terms of 
the membership, although Wilson himself had already sought to join the EEC in 1966 (Mammarella & 
Cacace, 2013, p. 127). Wilson was constrained between two sides of its own party; the majority willing to 
retain the UK’s full sovereignty, and a staunchly pro-European minority (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 136). A 
referendum was held in 1975 and the membership was backed by a large majority of the British voters in 
the 1975 referendum, with more than 67 percent of votes casted for continued membership.  
A BLUEPRINT FOR A SINGLE CURRENCY 
Soon it became clear that the next stage in the completion of the European integration project was the 
creation of a monetary union to reduce uncertainty in trade and complete the common market building 
(Bache, et al., 2011, p. 137). The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established to address this 
issue in February 1971, and the project took the name of ‘snake in the tunnel’. The member states’ 
currencies, including those of the four new member states, were free to float within a certain range, linked 
to one another and to the American dollar (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 137). The US decision to withdraw from 
the international convertibility system was a first setback to the European project. The sterling was forced 
to resort to floating exchange rates after being targeted by speculation, and so were Italy, France, and 
Sweden. Following the failure of the EMU, the new Commission appointed in 1977, under the presidency of 
Roy Jenkins, a British politician, launched a new scheme to lay the foundations for a common currency, the 
European Currency Unit (ECU), backed by a basket of national currencies. Member states committed 
themselves to fix an exchange rate with the ECU within wider margins of fluctuations than those of EMU. In 
addition to this, a common reserve fund would support countries in preventing speculation. Yet, the UK 
refused to take part to this initiative. 
THE YEARS OF DISCONTENT 
In the same years, the UK was facing an unprecedented rise in inflation which had sparked unrest among 
trade unionists, that culminated with multiple strikes that paralysed the country while the general 
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economic climate was rapidly deteriorating (Hay, 2010). Wage negotiations had failed, and the country had 
experienced the pains of the ‘three-day-week’, during which electricity was rationed (Hay, 2010). Social 
turmoil became evident in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment: in order to reduce the 
latter, the country experienced record levels of inflation, peaking at 25 percent in 1975 (Hay, 2010), while 
imports were becoming increasingly more expensive.    
The election of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister of the UK in 1979 marked a turning point for the 
British economy. While the economic downturn was continuing, Margaret Thatcher rose the issue of 
Britain’s contribution to the budget of the European Community; the UK was the third net contributor in 
1976, and the trend was suggesting that within a short time, Britain would become second (Bache, et al., 
2011, p. 144). This was due to Britain’s tendency to import more from outside the EC than other members, 
in combination with very little gains from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), given the small size of the 
sector in Britain and its efficiency (Bache, et al., 2011, p. 145). The CAP was the main policy of the EC at that 
time, and only 2 percent of the British workforce was employed in agriculture and it constituted only 2 
percent of national GDP (Mammarella & Cacace, 2013, p. 186). Eventually, Margaret Thatcher’s 
government managed to renegotiate the agreement with the Commission, reaching an end in 1985, after 
criticising the policy of the EC by saying that ‘it was not right that half of the total Community budget was 
being spent on storing and disposing of surplus food’ (Thatcher, 1988).  
The Single European Act of 1985, approved under the Delors Commission, paved the way to a reform of the 
process of European integration by addressing the need of a new institutional framework and by 
formalising the objective of a monetary union, which was fiercely opposed by Margaret Thatcher (Bache, et 
al., 2011, pp. 159-160). In the meantime, the prime minister was carrying out structural reforms modelled 
on her free-market approach, which intended to reduce the role of the state in the economy by privatising 
state-owned companies and lowering taxes on businesses. Most importantly, Thatcher adopted a 
monetarist approach to macroeconomics, which consisted of control of the money supply and credit, in 
combination with ensuring a good state balance (Seldon & Collings, 2013, p. 56). The inflation-target 
objective adopted in the country contributed to reducing inflation from 18 percent in 1980 to 3 percent six 
years later, until it rose up again in the early 1990s, when it peaked at 7.9 percent and the country fell into 
recession again (Seldon & Collings, 2013, p. 66), as it can be seen in Figure 1. Unemployment followed a 
similar pattern, changing from 3 million people in 1979 to 1.6 million at the end of the 1980s, before 
increasing again with the economic downturn of the 1990s (Seldon & Collings, 2013, p. 66), also 
represented in Figure 1.  
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Source: (Office for National Statistics, 2017b), (Office for National Statistics, 2017g) 
Note: 2017 values for unemployment until March, for inflation until May  
At the same time, the blueprint of Thatcher’s government was privatisations, which involved the sale of 
British Telecom and British Gas, and by 1990 50 previously state-controlled companies were sold or ready 
to be offered to private investors (Seldon & Collings, 2013, p. 68). On the side of the labour supply, 
Margaret Thatcher achieved her goal of reducing the influence and the power of trade unions, after a long 
dispute against them, which culminated in the 1982 Employment Act (Seldon & Collings, 2013, p. 68). From 
the early 1990s, the UK’s GDP started growing steadily at a faster pace than that of the European Union, as 
shown in Figure 2. In downturns, the UK did not perform significantly worse than the EU altogether. 
 
Source: (World Bank, 2017a) 
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A MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Margaret Thatcher’s strenuous opposition to the single currency was one of the main reasons behind her 
fall in the early 1990s, along with a proposed poll tax4 that sparked protests all over Britain. Margaret 
Thatcher defended her monetarist approach to control inflation over exchange rate stability, leading to 
frictions with her chancellor of the exchequer, Nigel Lawson, until she found herself outnumbered in her 
own Conservative Party (Seldon & Collings, 2013, p. 51). Her disagreements with the rest of the bloc 
became evident with her speech in Bruges (1988), where she called for a union that would ‘reflect the 
traditions and the aspirations of all its members’, with Britain refraining from being isolated and with its 
future as a part of the Community, that could foster prosperity and security for its people. Yet, she stressed 
that the guiding principle should be ‘willing cooperation among member states’, de facto rejecting the idea 
of closer integration, if it was not for economic cooperation.  
‘But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions 
to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.’ (Thatcher, 1988) 
To sum up, there were two points that Margaret Thatcher made in her speech: less political and more 
economic integration, and a more practical attitude towards policy-making (Thatcher, 1988). Her 
disengagement with the European cause made her to become isolated within her own party, eventually 
leading her to step down in November 1990, after Britain had (briefly) joined the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (EERM).   
Margaret Thatcher’s speech from 1988 has striking similarities with that of another British prime minister, 
David Cameron (2013). In 2013, addressing the audience at Bloomberg in London, he underlined his view 
that the European Union needed to undergo a radical change. Again, the UK was said not to be wanting 
isolation, and the European Union was defined again as a means of prosperity and stability. Yet, Cameron 
highlighted his vision for a new European Union that would address some main challenges. 
‘We urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective decision making that is holding us back. That 
means creating a leaner, less bureaucratic Union.’ (Cameron, et al., 2013) 
Cameron pointed to the situation of the Eurozone, at European competitiveness and the role of national 
sovereignty in policy-making. In his speech, he underlined the role of the single market as the core of the 
European Union, combined with a higher degree of flexibility which would allow Britain to opt-out for 
                                                             
4 Also known as ‘community charge’, that everyone using a public service would be subject to pay, regardless of their 
income. 
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further integration to which it is not committed, and, by denying the existence of a European demos, a 
renewed primary role for national parliaments as representatives of democracy in designing policies. At the 
end of his speech, he committed himself to address the unresolved issue of membership in British politics 
by calling a referendum. 
‘It is time for the British people to have their say. […] If we left the European Union, it would be a 
one-way ticket, not a return.’ (Cameron, et al., 2013) 
The referendum would be called on a settlement between the European Union and the European Council 
regarding the role of the UK in the EU. One year later, Cameron announced that in case he would be re-
elected for a second term as prime minister, he would call a referendum (Baldini, 2016, p. 28). After his re-
election in 2015, Cameron sought to secure a deal with the European Council, which came after the 
meeting on 18 and 19 February 2016. The deal contained decisions concerning economic governance, 
competitiveness, and concessions in relation to migration policy and provisions for the financial district of 
the City of London (European Council, 2016). The deal would come into effect from the moment the UK 
would officially inform the Secretary-General of the European Council of its intention to remain part of the 
European Union. On the following day, the prime minister announced the date of the referendum, set for 
23 June.  
A COMEDY OF ERRORS 
The EU referendum debate seems to have arisen from the necessity to address British people’s detachment 
and hostility towards the European Union, perceived as a source of regulatory burden, with an unfair 
distribution of resources (Cameron, et al., 2013). British people have never showed a high degree of 
attachment to the European Union, but the trend changed in the year before the referendum (European 
Commission, 2017). Comparing figures for British interviewee who at least to some extent feel citizens of 
the European Union with those who do not feel the same, it is possible to see that the former increased 
constantly, and in 2015 becoming more than those who do not feel European citizens, as it appears in Fig. 
3. British citizens who also felt they belonged to the European Union too represented 27 percent in 2016. 
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Source: (European Commission, 2017) 
Note: affirmative or slightly positive answers are ‘Yes’, whereas negative or slightly negative responses are counted as ‘No’. 
Possibly, the rise was due to increased awareness of the European institutions, because they became the 
centre of the EU referendum debate. Yet, the referendum saw the UK choosing Brexit, with 51.9 percent of 
voted casted for leave the European Union, and a turnout of 72.2 percent (The Electoral Commission, 
2016).  As a consequence of the result of the referendum, Cameron resigned, calling for the need of ‘fresh 
leadership’ (The Guardian, 2016a). After a contest inside the Conservative Party, Theresa May, former 
Home Secretary, was chosen to be the next prime minister, and she took office on 13 July 2016. Only after 
nine months since the Brexit vote the process to leave the European Union officially started, when a letter 
notifying the European Council of the intention to leave was delivered to its president, Donald Tusk, 
according to procedures outlined in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, progress on the actual start of 
negotiations seems to have been little until recently; in fact, on 18 April 2017 snap elections were called to 
ensure that the government has the necessary stability to start negotiations under a ‘strong and stable 
leadership’ (The Telegraph, 2017). General elections held on the 8 June resulted in a hung parliament, with 
the Tories losing 13 seats in the House of Commons although gaining 5.5 percent compared to general 
elections in 2015, forcing them to seek to form a coalition government with the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) (BBC, 2017a). Thus, the political gamble of Theresa May does not seem to have paid off, as her 
majority shrunk, making it more unlikely for the government to move together and speed up in the Brexit 
talks. 
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The short-term consequences of Brexit 
Brexit is supposed to happen within two years of the official notification to the European Council of the 
United Kingdom’s intention to leave. Yet, such a decision has already produced effects on financial markets 
and real economy, and sometimes they seem to contradict forecasts for what would happen once the 
United Kingdom leaves the European Union. A mismatch between immediate consequences and forecasts 
does not imply that predictions are wrong; simply, it is about different timeframes. 
THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Brexit is a leap in the dark. A member state exiting the European Union is a totally unprecedented event 
(PwC, 2016a). Research has tried to ascertain possible scenarios for the United Kingdom after its exit from 
the European Union, and econometrics has sought to precisely quantify gains and losses, winners and 
losers, but only from the moment Brexit would actually happen. Reality tells us that the road to that 
moment is long and winding, and negotiations so far have been particularly slow. This has triggered a 
climate of heavy uncertainty that threatens to harm the UK’s economy.  
To a certain degree, uncertainty is an inherent factor in the economy; rational economic agents should use 
all the information available to them to make the best decision for their interests. The case of Brexit is 
different: the British economy has received an uncertainty shock, with unpredictability surging suddenly as 
a result of largely unexpected political developments that are likely to have strong implications for the 
economy.  
Recent history of the United Kingdom seems to suggest that there is some inverse relationship between 
economic performance and uncertainty. During the most recent financial crisis in 2008, economic growth 
plunged, while an indicator elaborated by the Federal Reserve of St Louis (2017) surged, as shown in Figure 
4. Plotting together GDP growth and uncertainty change, it appears that when the economy moves 
downward and production slows, uncertainty rises. After the financial crisis, uncertainty peaked again by 
the end of 2015, reaching over 1.5 percent in 2016, as the possibility of exiting the European Union became 
increasingly real and GDP started growing at a more modest pace.  
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Source: (Eurostat, 2017), (Baker, et al., 2017) 
The announcement of the EU referendum, and especially its outcome, are likely to have contributed to an 
increase in the feeling of uncertainty, as it appears in Fig. 5, and this might have changed investors’ 
expectations to negative. The uncertainty indicator shows rising uncertainty since January 2016, around the 
time when the referendum was announced, although the rise could be due to other factors. Causality 
seems to be clearer later in the year, when from May the trend is markedly upward. In June 2016 
uncertainty stood at over 799 points, hitting a record high in July at over 1140 points.  
 
Source: (Baker, et al., 2017) 
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Fig. 4: Uncertainty and nominal GDP growth, over 
one year earlier
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Given the rise in unpredictability linked to the referendum, it is possible that uncertainty would be one of 
the channels through which economic performance of the UK will be affected.  
Uncertainty is likely to have hit the UK economy twice. Firstly, there was no consensus among pollsters 
about the outcome of the referendum from the moment it was called, with the margin getting narrower as 
time passed (Financial Times, 2016). Secondly, uncertainty has been the natural consequence of a vote to 
leave, with the UK definitively confirming its intention to regain full sovereignty. The government 
committed itself to honour the will of British people, thus triggering a period of uncertainty about the 
short-term and long-term status of the UK. As a consequence, uncertainty is one of the main channels 
through which the UK’s economic performance will be affected (Irwin, 2015). 
Uncertainty might cause harm to the economy through several different channels. In general, in an 
uncertain climate, economic agents tend to reassess their financial position, devoting less resources to 
consumption and increasing savings (OECD, 2016a). The first effect could result in a contraction of demand 
for goods and services. Households, companies, and investors would immediately readjust their spending 
decisions to shelter from potentially worsening economic conditions by increasing their savings or 
contracting more debt in the form of loans. Decisions would be made with the idea of being worse-off in 
the future. Firms would have no certainty about the continued internal and external demand for their 
products and services. In addition to this, the threat of tariff and non-tariff barriers in trade with the EU 
could delay investments in new markets abroad. Uncertainty could also impact on foreign direct 
investment (FDI), especially in terms of political instability; the presence of institutional soundness is one of 
the factors that has made the UK attractive for businesses over the years (Irwin, 2015). Lowering 
investments would also affect hiring decisions, causing companies to reduce vacancies or to respond to a 
decrease in demand by making workers redundant. Job security would be hit, and households would 
increase savings even more to cope with increased instability of the labour market. Financial markets would 
be more volatile and more vulnerable to panic shocks. Financial investors might choose to relocate their 
investments abroad, or they might ask for higher risk premia to compensate for increased default risks. 
Borrowing would be more expensive for companies and households, but also for the government. 
Uncertainty would contribute to a self-fulfilling crisis that could only be curbed by clarity about the future. 
HOW THE POUND REACTED 
The pound has become an accurate thermometer for the heated climate surrounding Brexit. Throughout 
2016 and during the first months of 2017, the exchange rate between the pound and some of the major 
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currencies was impacted by the uncertainty about the future of the United Kingdom outside the European 
Union. 
The pound’s exchange rate against the dollar is shown in Fig. 6, whereas the pound against the euro is 
presented in Fig. 7. The exchange rate was volatile throughout the first months of 2016, with a standard 
deviation of 0.014 against the dollar and a slightly higher standard deviation against the euro, at 0.023, 
from the beginning of January 2016 until 20 February 2016. Although the exchange rate was slightly volatile 
in the first period of 2016, the pound sharply depreciated after David Cameron’s announcement of the EU 
referendum and the former influential Mayor of London Boris Johnson’s public decision to support the 
leave campaign, hitting a 7-year low record against the dollar on 22 February 2016 (PwC, 2016a). The fall of 
the pound was rather modest in comparison to the value at the beginning of the month, but after it went 
down by 1 percent, a period of heightened volatility began. Within one month, the pound fell from 1.46 
against the dollar to 1.39. Similarly, against the euro the pound dropped from 1.33 euros for one pound to 
only 1.27 euros. 
 
Source: (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2017) 
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Fig. 6: GBP/USD exchange rate
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Source: (European Central Bank, 2017) 
A considerable fall happened the day after the referendum, when the outcome was officially announced. In 
the run-up to the vote, investors had shown confidence in a remain vote, as the pound appreciated, being 
traded for 1.48 dollars and 1.31 euros on 23 June. As markets opened on the following day, sterling 
dropped, ending up losing almost 9 percent against the dollar and depreciating by 5 percent against the 
euro. By the end of the day, one pound could only buy 1.36 dollars, and just 1.24 euros. The pound kept 
falling in the aftermath of the referendum, as the dollar appreciated by 3 percent against the pound on 25 
June. At the beginning of July 2017, the pound had depreciated by over 10 percent against the dollar, and it 
had fallen by more than 8 percent against the euro. Standard deviation against the dollar rose to 0.086, and 
it increased to 0.062 against the euro in the period from January 2016 to 15 May 2017. 
Big sell-offs of sterling-denominated assets began in the aftermath of the referendum, possibly as a result 
of investors’ rising fears over the UK’s long-term economic performance. The ditching of UK assets led to a 
dramatic plunge in the value of the pound, which is likely to have influenced expectations about a delayed 
increase in official bank rates and might have fuelled concerns over the UK’s widening current-account 
deficit, which is represented in Fig. 8.  
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Source: (Office for National Statistics, 2017a) 
Markets seem to have shown their hostility to Brexit, weighting the prospects of deterioration of economic 
activity and increased risk deriving from a rise in uncertainty (HM Treasury, 2016b). As investors started 
losing confidence in the soundness of the UK’s economy and readjusted expectations, they might have 
requested higher premia to compensate the risk of holding assets denominated in pounds, thus increasing 
the risk premia on the exchange rate.  
Increased risk premia are not the only negative consequence of a depreciation of sterling. A weaker 
currency could boost export, but this does not seem to be the case for the UK. Whether exports could grow 
faster than imports depends on the degree of elasticity of internal and external demand; data collected 
during the 2008 recession show that the pound depreciation did not have remarkably positive effects on 
UK exports (HM Treasury, 2016b), although the crisis had also hit other countries, thus reducing their 
imports. Moreover, exports could become gradually more expensive, as there might be no ‘pass-through’ 
of the exchange rate, and consumers might have to bear an increase in inflation rate. A yeast-based spread 
popular in the UK, Marmite, was at the centre of a price controversy between its European producer and 
some British retailers, for example; in order to offset losses caused by the pound’s depreciation, Marmite 
now costs 13 percent more than it used to before the referendum (The Economist, 2016).  
However, gains from a weaker pound in terms of exports could be limited. When a country exports raw 
materials, a home currency depreciation boosts exports. Yet, the United Kingdom seem to rely on imports 
to export; this means that British businesses import a certain amount of goods and services, transform 
them into new products, and then export them again. The higher the share of imported materials or 
services for each unit of exported goods, the smaller the gains triggered by a depreciation of the pound. 
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Tab. 1 shows that the UK depends on imports to export much more than the European Union. On average, 
21 percent of a unit of British exports derive from imports, while this is only 13 percent for the European 
Union. Similarly, figures for the UK are almost double for the manufacturing and services sectors than that 
of the European Union.   
Tab. 1: Imports content of exports in the mid-2000s 
 United Kingdom European Union 
Total 0.213 0.131 
Manufactures 0.318 0.167 
Services 0.110 0.059 
Source: (OECD, 2012) 
The pound’s depreciation might fall short of stimulating the economy. In the UK, manufacturing and 
agriculture, the sectors that could be more competitive with a weaker sterling, account for less than 20 
percent of GDP in value-added terms, whilst services value-added is over 80 percent of GDP, as in Tab. 2. 
Tab. 2: Value-added, % of GDP 
 1996 2006 2016 
 UK EU UK EU UK EU 
Agriculture 1.25 2.62 0.62 1.70 0.61 1.52 
Manufactures 27.84 28.71 22.05 26.73 19.17 24.04 
Services 70.91 68.10 77.33 71.57 80.22 74.08 
Source: (World Bank, 2017b) 
Since the referendum, the pound has remained weak both against the dollar and the euro, and has 
continued to be volatile. This might cause foreign investors to lose confidence in sterling-denominated 
investments, and might also lead to a reduction in foreign direct investment (FDI), because a weak currency 
may not outweigh the price of heightened political instability.  The value of the pound reached record lows 
in October 2016, consistent with the gloomy climate surrounding negotiations with the European Union to 
define the terms of exit (The Guardian, 2016b). On 4 October, the pound hit a 31-year low, going as low as 
1.27 dollars exchanged for one British pound. There has been no recovery so far for the pound, which has 
been constantly below the pre-referendum highs. Clearly, a depreciation of the pound helps all those 
businesses that are export-oriented, whose goods and services become cheaper for foreign buyers. At the 
same time, the FTSE 100, one of the main indices of the London stock market that groups companies whose 
revenues are denominated in dollars, soared. 
IMPACT ON THE STOCK MARKET 
The financial sector of the UK is the most developed of the European Union. It accounts for almost one-
quarter of all income deriving from financial services in the European Union, and it represents 40 percent of 
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financial services exports from the European Union (Bank of England, 2015). To date, over 7 percent of 
value-added in the UK is represented by the finance and insurance sector, whilst the European Union 
average stands at about 5 percent, as it can be seen in Fig. 9. This is because the UK, and namely London, 
have become a hub for financial services and insurance over the years, creating a network of financial 
institutions with an international orientation. The value-added of finance and insurance sector has 
increased rapidly from 2000, peaking at 9 percent in 2010, after a drop in the years of the financial crisis, 
and then averaging just below 7.5 percent from 2011 onwards. In comparison to that of the European 
Union (including the UK), the share of financial and insurance value-added is much higher in the UK.  
 
Source: (OECD, 2017c) 
The financial sector growth was driven by the liberalisation of capital flows in the 1970s, and further 
liberalisations of financial services in the 1980s (Bank of England, 2015). Alongside internal policy changes, 
the UK’s membership of the European Union has enhanced its openness and dynamism, hence making the 
United Kingdom a more attractive place for FDI (PwC, 2016b). One of the factors that promoted the 
clustering of financial services in the City in recent years is that the UK benefits from the so-called 
‘passporting rights’, a rule that allows a financial institution licensed in any of the EEA countries to open 
new branches, subsidiaries, or conduct cross-border transactions in any other EEA countries without the 
need of additional authorisations (Bank of England, 2015). This has meant that third-countries’ financial 
institutions have increasingly chosen the UK as headquarters for their operations in the European Union 
(PwC, 2016b), so that in 2014 358 banks were present in the UK, with 80 being European (Bank of England, 
2015). It is clear that exiting the European Union and failing to agree to be part of the EEA would imply 
losing passporting rights and would induce banks and other financial institutions to relocate elsewhere in 
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the European Union to maintain their operability. In fact, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs are threatening to move their facilities and staff to the European Union (The 
Guardian, 2017; Bloomberg, 2017c); ING is going against the current by moving trading jobs into London, 
convinced it will retain its role as a financial hub (The Telegraph, 2016), although little has happened so far.  
Certainly, something happened when the referendum was announced and when results were made public. 
Investors were immediately affected by the news and reacted with sell-offs of equities that caused a slump 
in the FTSE 100, represented in Fig. 10. As in the case of the exchange rate, losses were limited in February 
2016 following the announcement of the referendum, and the blue-chip index closed at a higher level on 
22 February in comparison to the Friday before. Investors were probably encouraged by the deal signed by 
David Cameron, that included special provisions for the financial district, and felt optimistic about the 
economic outlook of the UK. With the referendum results, the investors’ reaction was radically different. 
On opening, the index fell by over 8 percent, losing more than 5 percent in a week. Panic spread rapidly, 
leading to huge sell-offs of assets. The plunge of the FTSE 100 was consistent with a shock that hit all the 
economy, and thus also this index, regardless of the fact that most of its companies are non-British. 
 
Source: (Bloomberg, 2017a) 
On 29 June 2016, FTSE 100 companies had already forgotten about the losses. From that moment on, the 
index began to increase its value. This would be surprising, but the good performance of the FTSE 100 
should not be misleading. In fact, the FTSE 100 mainly comprises internationally-oriented companies, 
whose profits are boosted by the pound depreciation, as they are normally in dollars, and this was the case 
(PwC, 2016b). In addition to this, export is encouraged by a weak pound, and exporters of goods and 
services can benefit from absence of trade barriers and a weak currency while it lasts, until the negotiations 
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over a Brexit deal are concluded. Behind such a good performance there could also be the data about the 
UK’s GDP, which is still growing in spite of the negative outlook that analysts predict for the country.  
On the other hand, the FTSE 250 instead comprises more domestic-oriented companies, from national 
transport groups such as First or National Express to clothing brands such as Ted Baker, but it includes also 
real estate agents such as Savills, and bakers like Greggs and Domino’s Pizza (London Stock Exchange, 
2017). Thus, this market is likely to be less exposed to international fluctuations such as those triggered by 
Brexit. In fact, as it appears from Fig. 11, there is no record of relevant losses in February 2016 around the 
time of the referendum announcement. Yet, one week after the referendum the index had turned to 
negative figures, losing almost 14 percent of its pre-referendum value. Volatility increased around the 
referendum date. This can be due to heightened uncertainty about internal demand, which could be 
harmed by a weaker pound in combination with rising inflation and decreasing real wages that would limit 
households’ purchasing power and would induce them to save more and consume less as a precautionary 
measure. Growing GDP in the UK seems to have convinced investors that demand would not decrease 
significantly, at least in the short-term. In reality, another factor that could have favoured the growth of the 
firms part of the FTSE 250 is rising inflation; price levels recorded marked increases for most of the sectors 
that the companies of the FTSE 250 are part of. In 2017, inflation is on the rise for transport (5.7 percent), 
clothing and footwear (1.6 percent), housing (1.2 percent), and food (0.9). Rising inflation could be 
perceived as higher revenues, bearing in mind that wages are fixed in the short-term, thus potentially 
increasing the firms’ mark-up on sales. 
 
Source: (Bloomberg, 2017b) 
12500
13500
14500
15500
16500
17500
18500
19500
20500
21500
22500
4
/1
/2
01
6
1/
2/
20
16
29
/2
/2
01
6
30
/3
/2
01
6
27
/4
/2
01
6
26
/5
/2
01
6
24
/6
/2
01
6
22
/7
/2
01
6
19
/8
/2
01
6
19
/9
/2
01
6
17
/1
0/
20
16
14
/1
1/
20
16
12
/1
2/
20
16
12
/1
/2
01
7
9
/2
/2
01
7
9
/3
/2
01
7
6
/4
/2
01
7
9/
5/
20
17
7
/6
/2
01
7
G
B
P
Fig. 11: FTSE 250
30 
 
Interesting findings emerge from an analysis of the performance around the dates of the referendum 
announcement and of the aftermath of the referendum. As examples, a wide range of companies quoted 
on the London Stock Exchange with assets denominated in pounds can be taken. 
THE PLUNGE IN DETAILS: SOME CASE STUDIES 
The banking sector seems to be the field that was most struck by the shock of the announcement of the 
referendum and even more by the outcome of the vote. Barclays is a multinational bank headquartered in 
London and specialised in multinational services.  
  
Source: (Yahoo Finance, 2017) 
After the announcement of the referendum on 20 February 2016, Barclays closed 2 percent lower, as 
shown in Fig. 12.A, but on 24 June 2016 the pattern was much more marked, when it went down by 17 
percent by the end of the day, as it is evident from Fig. 12.B.  
Also the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) performed badly in both cases, with a sharper fall in June 2016 
compared to that of the beginning of the year when the referendum was announced.  
  
Source: (Yahoo Finance, 2017) 
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The trend was negative during the period of the EU referendum announcement, when prices went from 
246 pounds per share on 19 February to 232 pounds on 24 February, as it is represented in Fig. 13.A. The 
worse was yet to come, and the bank was hit by the UK’s decision to leave, with prices falling by over 30 
percent within 4 days from the referendum, as shown in Fig. 13.B. On 5 July 2016, possibly still affected by 
the Brexit result, RBS was almost 37 percent lower than the day of the referendum. 
Brexit casts doubts also on issues related to movement of people between the United Kingdom and the rest 
of the European Union, as one of the arguments for Brexit was to limit immigration, and this was a point 
highlighted in the European Council meeting in February 2016, with special concessions made to the UK to 
clamp down on immigration and benefits for non-native people (European Council, 2016). This would 
discourage also work-related movement of people to and from the UK. At the same time, Brexit could 
affect holidaymakers and business travellers in the form of increased security checks, translating into 
longer waiting times at international terminals. For airlines, it could also mean increased regulatory 
difficulty to access the European Union’s aerospace, as long as the British government’s inability to 
participate in shaping air-traffic regulations. International Airlines Group (IAG), that controls British 
Airways, headquartered in London, and Iberia, located in Barcelona, and the Irish Aer Lingus, shows that 
investors were concerned by Brexit.  
  
Source: (Yahoo Finance, 2017) 
IAG showed volatility during the first months of 2016, which appears from Fig. 14.A, so it might be difficult 
to point at an evident causality between the referendum announcement and its performance. The causal 
link seems somewhat clearer after 23 June, when its value went down by almost 23 percent, represented in 
Fig. 14.B.  
The housing market was affected by the sudden shock because investors expected a combined effect of 
rising uncertainty that induces households to save more as a precaution, and rising inflation that would 
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reduce real incomes. Big-ticket spending decisions are likely to be postponed following a rise in uncertainty. 
As one of the largest builder of new homes in the UK, Tailor Wimpey was struck by the referendum.  
  
Source: (Yahoo Finance, 2017) 
Fig. 15.A shows that volatility was present throughout the first period of 2016, although the company 
closed 4 percent lower on the day following the announcement of the referendum. As for the other 
companies, the drop was far more dramatic in June, as it appears in Fig. 15.B; in two days, shares were 
almost 40 percent cheaper.  
THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT DEBT: THE GILT MARKET 
A combination of hope and fear has produced mixed results on gilts, sterling-denominated liabilities issued 
by the HM Treasury on behalf of the UK government are offered to investors, and the gilt market’s changes 
are represented in Fig. 16. In February, when David Cameron announced that a referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the European Union would be held, short-term, medium-term, and long-term conventional 
gilts5 showed a decrease in average yields of around 30 basis points. Such a drop could be part of the 
normal volatility of gilts yields, and interest rates stayed constant at around 0.87 percent for the short-
term, 1.45 percent and 2.32 percent for medium-term and long-term bonds respectively until the 
referendum. The spectrum of Brexit had led analysts to forecast an immediate downgrading of the UK’s 
sovereign debt in case British people chose to leave the European Union (PwC, 2016a). In fact, after the 
referendum rating agencies lowered their expectations for the UK; Moody’s changed its outlook to 
negative, Fitch from AA+ to AA, and S&P downgraded the UK debt from AAA to AA (BBC, 2016). 
Surprisingly, investors seemed to disregard the caveat issued by the rating agencies; interest rates on 
government gilts plunged, down by over 50 basis points in July in comparison to the levels of the month 
                                                             
5 Conventional gilts are the most common liabilities issued by the HM Treasury, and they are not indexed to inflation. 
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before the referendum. Interest rates and price are inversely correlated, so a decrease in yields suggests 
that there was a rally to buy government debt.  
 
Source: (United Kingdom Debt Management Office, 2017) 
This could be explained with investors rushing to purchase safer assets. At the same time, investors might 
have trusted the Bank of England’s repeated announcements of easing monetary policy further in case of a 
strong depreciation of sterling (Bank of England, 2016). Eventually, the Bank of England cut bank rates from 
0.5 to 0.25 in August, and furthered a programme of quantitative easing that started in 2009 in response to 
the financial crisis. The new measures decided by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) aimed to sustain 
growth and to lead inflation closer to the 2 percent target included also a plan to purchase up to £60 billion 
of gilts and £10 billion of UK corporate bonds. In spite of the additional package of measures of the Bank of 
England, yields on gilts began to rise again from September 2016, which could be explained with investors 
renewing their interest in the equity market, possibly ruling out further reductions of the official bank rate. 
Also, fear that rising inflation above the 2 percent target could eat off their revenues on fixed-yield gilts 
could lead investors to resort to reduce UK gilts in their portfolio. 
HOW THE GDP HAS CHANGED OVERTIME 
Some British newspaper that had backed Brexit triumphantly emphasised that GDP kept growing in spite of 
the EU referendum outcome. It is true that GDP continued its growth even after the referendum, yet this 
should not lead to the conclusion that the referendum has produced no harm to the economy. 
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Source: (Office for National Statistics, 2017e), (Office for National Statistics, 2017d) 
To date, GDP in the UK has recorded the 17th consecutive quarter of growth (Office for National Statistics, 
2017c), as it can be seen in Fig. 17. Volatility on markets and expectations about the moves of the Bank of 
England might have driven the slow growth pace of GDP in the first quarter of 2016, although it cannot be 
ruled out that uncertainty about a possible future economic downturn triggered by a Brexit result could 
have had an impact on a modest 0.2 percent GDP growth. The statistical bulletin released by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) (2016) covering the third quarter of 2016, that from July to September, suggested 
that economy was not significantly affected by the outcome of the referendum, although the GDP growth 
rate slowed to 0.5 percent, compared to 0.7 percent of the previous quarter. The last quarter of the year 
saw a marked increase in the contribution of energy industry (3.1 percent) and manufacturing (1.2 percent) 
to national output levels, and services also grew by 0.8 percent, hauling a generalised increase in 
production. The pattern could be explained with initial hesitation of businesses consistent with the 
uncertainty that was caused by the referendum, which was followed by a regain in confidence, relying on 
the fact that Brexit would not happen shortly. Absence of tariffs and a weak pound could be behind the 
increase in manufacturing industries’ contribution to GDP growth, and the same could go for services, 
which account for 78.8 percent if the total UK’s GDP (Office for National Statistics, 2017c). Almost one year 
after the referendum, in the first quarter of 2017 the UK’s GDP appeared to have reduced its growth speed, 
returning again to the levels of the year before. This might be due to a reduction in household spending 
that seems to have affected primarily consumer-facing industries, such as retail and accommodation, and 
simultaneously due to a rise in prices  (Office for National Statistics, 2017c).  
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HOW BUSINESS CONFIDENCE WAS AFFECTED 
The Organisation for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) has developed a Business confidence 
index (BCI) that attempts to put a value on firms’ current situation and their expectations for the short-
term, and it includes companies’ judgments about production, orders, and stocks (OECD, 2017a). Opinions 
are compared to a ‘normal’ long-term average fixed at 100. The BCI is shown in Fig. 18. 
 
Source: (OECD, 2017a) 
After 2011, UK’s firms have had a positive outlook over their future, generally outperforming the levels 
recorded in the Euro Area. After a small reduction in confidence around the date of the referendum, 
businesses have shown positive outlook, and levels of confidence jumped from 100.75 in July 2016 to 
101.82 in March 2017, when the United Kingdom officially notified the European Union of its intention to 
leave. Such a rise in confidence might derive from above-expectations economic climate after the 
referendum, thus to those same factors that cause the GDP to increase. However, the index takes into 
account immediate expectations; this is consistent with macroeconomic data which show ongoing GDP 
growth, while an official Brexit is still not in sight. 
THE CASE OF INFLATION AND WAGES 
It is somehow inevitable that a weaker pound correlates with higher inflation rate, with a consequent 
impact on the purchasing power of British households. Higher inflation, in combination with unchanging or 
even decreasing growth pace of nominal wages, reduces the spending capability of wage-earners. High 
levels of inflation combined with tumbling growth of wages seems to be the case for the United Kingdom, 
as it appears from Fig. 19. 
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Source: (Office for National Statistics, 2017h), (Office for National Statistics, 2017f) 
After the peaks in inflation that preceded Margaret Thatcher’s reforms, and after its reduction which came 
at the cost of higher levels of unemployment, the United Kingdom has experienced a period of stability 
throughout the early 2000s, until the global financial crisis plunged the country into recession, as in Fig. 1. A 
considerable injection of liquidity in the British economy contributed to increase the inflation rate from 
2015 (Bank of England, 2017). Uncertainty about the outcome of the referendum and the unpredictability 
caused by its result led investors to expect a monetary policy intervention by the Bank of England, that 
occurred with a further cut of the bank rate from 0.5 to 0.25 (Bank of England, 2016). This contributed to a 
jump in inflation that reached 2.4 percent, which was at 0.64 the year before, but simultaneously 
unemployment increased from 1.8 percent in 2016 to 3.22 in the first months of 2017. Such a toxic 
combination makes it hard for the monetary policy to be effective to boost growth. According to a recent 
survey released by the European Commission (2016), 36 percent of British interviewee thought that 
inflation was the most important issue they were facing, much higher than the 27 percent average of the 
European Union. In May, prices hit a four-year high growing at 2.9 percent in comparison to 12 months 
before. In April inflation stood at 2.7 percent, whilst weekly nominal wages grew only by 1.2 percent: thus, 
higher prices seem to be eroding purchasing power by reducing real wages.  
HOW CONSUMER CONFIDENCE WAS AFFECTED 
Households’ outlook is not as positive as that of businesses. Another indicator by OECD, the Consumer 
confidence index (CCI), takes into account households’ situation and expectations for the short-term future 
by considering their purchases plans and their economic status (OECD, 2017b). Similarly to that of 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
Ja
n
-1
6
Fe
b
-1
6
M
ar
-1
6
A
pr
-1
6
M
ay
-1
6
Ju
n-
16
Ju
l-
16
A
ug
-1
6
Se
p
-1
6
O
ct
-1
6
N
o
v-
16
D
ec
-1
6
Ja
n
-1
7
Fe
b
-1
7
M
ar
-1
7
A
pr
-1
7
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 c
h
an
ge
Fig. 19: Inflation rate and weekly growth of 
nominal wages, % over one year earlier
CPI inflation rate Weekly nominal wages
37 
 
businesses, a ‘normal’ long-term average level is set at 100. The findings of the OECD’s calculations are 
represented in Fig. 20. 
 
Source: (OECD, 2017b) 
From the end of 2015, households’ confidence has decreased, slightly regaining value in May 2016, right 
before the EU referendum. Little variation has occurred since then, although the trend seems to be 
generally negative, has confidence has decreased from 100.88 in May 2016 to 100.52 in May 2017, possibly 
hinting at the deterioration of economic conditions of households as a consequence of rising inflation. 
THE REAL ESTATE MARKET 
Consumers tend to postpone big-ticket economic decision in ties of uncertainty. Buying a new house is 
probably a hard choice that involves careful financial planning for a household. Uncertainty normally 
induces people to save more as a form of precaution against deteriorating economic conditions, and this 
imply that consumers tend to postpone important spending decisions to times when prospects are clearer, 
or households accumulate more debt through loans. Moreover, uncertainty about the outcome of the 
negotiations is likely to affect migrants’ decisions to move to the UK, thus impacting on the house demand 
for migrant workers. Higher average house prices are likely to reflect higher demand, whereas prices going 
down might be a sign of a contraction in demand. The annual House Price Index (HPI) elaborated by HM 
Land Registry in collaboration with the Office for National Statistics (2017) aims to capture such changes. 
The growth rate of prices in the real estate market for England (and not the other countries of the UK) are 
presented in Fig. 21. 
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Source: (Land Registry; Office for National Statistics, 2017) 
England might be taken as a proxy of house prices in the UK due to its higher population and a more 
developed economy than that of the other countries. The index shows that house prices growth recorded a 
downward trend around February 2016, when the referendum was announced. Compared to 12 months 
before, house prices in February grew slightly slower than in January, at 8.46 percent against 8.63 percent 
recorded at the very beginning of the year. After a rise to 9.49 percent in March, prices averaged 8.68 
percent growth in the following two months. The sudden decrease occurred with the referendum; growth 
slid to 8.15 percent in July, one month after the referendum, and hit a draught of 5.32 percent in January 
2017, when the downward trend came to a temporary stop, before falling again in March and plunging to 
4.91. 
 
Source: (Land Registry; Office for National Statistics, 2017) 
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Fig. 21: Annual house prices growth rate in 
England, %
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London is often significantly different from the rest of England when it comes to evaluate living costs, 
because it is generally considered to be more expensive. Namely, London might be affected by financial 
outflows which are likely to cause the workforce in the financial sector to relocate abroad, thus reducing 
demand for lodging. Taking the region of London shows enhanced changes compared to the situation of 
England, as captured in Fig. 22, relying on the same index as for the case of England. The drop in February 
2016 in London was more consistent, from 13.56 percent to 13.09 percent, and it was followed by a rise, 
with house prices growing over 14 percent faster in March than the year before. In London, the financial 
capital of Europe, house prices growth started slowing in June, reaching a lowest of 3.1 percent growth in 
March 2017. It is likely that this trend reflects expectations about the future, and fears of an economic 
downturn. Simultaneously, inflation might lead to reverse causality for house prices, whose growth could 
be the result of a combination of generally higher price levels and a contraction in demand. 
TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION 
Immigration was one of the leading themes in the campaign to leave the European Union. That of 
immigration seems to be a concern of British people, with 6 percent of them considering it a worry, down 
from 11 percent in a previous survey (European Commission, 2016). Immigration  does not seem to have 
had a negative impact on the British well-being, in spite of the claims of Brexit campaigners  (Dhingra, et al., 
2016d). Brexit has led to the government advocating a cap on migration inflows, which was already 
included in the agreement signed by David Cameron with the European Council in February 2016 (European 
Council, 2016). Figures suggest that although no significant measures to reduce migration have been 
enforced in the last few months, net migration dropped at the end of 2016. 
 
Source: (Office for National Statistics, 2017i) 
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Provisional data for the second half of 2016 show a downward trend in migration to the UK, as it can be 
seen in Fig. 23 for all nationalities. Migration went down by 7 percent since March 2016, and net migration 
decreased by approximately 49 thousand units.  
At the same time, hate crime is on the rise. Analysing official data plotted in Fig. 24, reported hate crime 
growth rate appears to have slowed down in the run-up to the referendum, but the trend is still positive, 
and in 2015/2016, the period of the EU referendum, crime connected to race increased by 15 percent over 
the previous year, with over 49 thousand cases reported to the police, and hostilities on religious grounds 
increased by 35 percent, with over 4 thousand cases.  
 
Source: (Home Office, 2017)   
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Conclusions 
Brexit is a historic decision for the United Kingdom, and for the European Union. Being the decision 
unprecedented, research has sought to forecast the long-term consequences of the vote to leave, but there 
is no definitive answer about the future situation of the UK outside the European Union. Those who 
supported Brexit naively welcomed some positive figures about GDP growth released after the vote, 
although the consequences of leaving the European Union might have begun to affect the economy in 
many other direct and indirect ways, mainly through enhanced uncertainty. Uncertainty, in fact, seems to 
have risen around the date of the referendum announcement, and more markedly after the vote to leave. 
Generally, indicators that measure short-term economic performance worsened after the announcement, 
and deteriorated even more with the referendum result being official. It seems reasonable that most of the 
changes that occurred in the short-term are the result of the negative consequences of leaving the 
European Union in terms of heightened uncertainty and pessimistic expectations about the future. 
Households, businesses, and investors reacted to the Brexit shock by readjusting their behaviour to cope 
with heightened unpredictability, while volatility increased and even immigration trends slew down. 
Overall, the economy seems to have already been hit hard by the EU referendum announcement and by its 
outcome. Not an encouraging start for those who wanted their country and their money back. 
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